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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SHERMAN CARTER, A Taxpayer,
for himself and all others
similarly situated,
Plaintiff

vs.
BEAVER COUNTY SERVICE AREA
NUMBER ONE, a body corporate and
politic, JAMES G. WILLIAMS,
PAULK. NIELSON, EVAN C.
NIELSEN, ALLEN C. REYNOLDS,
and ARLO MESSINGER, as
Trustees of said Service Area,

Case No.

Defendants

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Beaver County Service Area Number One was
created in 1959 under authority of Title 17, Chapter 29,
of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, for the
purpose of building a hospital. There are about 3700 people
in Beaver County and approximately 2,000 live in Service
Area Number One. Service Area Number One consists of
the Eastern one-half of Beaver County and includes only
one third class city, which is Beaver City, and several unincorporated and rural communities. Service Area Number Two is the Western one-half of Beaver County and the
two service areas combined cover all of Beaver County.
Service Area Number One has assessed and collected taxes
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for three years, has acquired property for a building site
for a hospital and has expended funds for architect's fees.,
attorney's fees, and other purposes. The validity of the
act which allowed the creation of such a service area is
questioned.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
SAID ACT VIOLATES ARTICLE VI, SECTION 29
OF THE UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION IN THAT IT
DELEGATES TO A SPECIAL COMMISSION, A PRIVATE CORPORATION OR ASSOCIATION POWER TO
MAKE, SUPERVISE OR INTERFERE WITH MUNICIPAL IMPROVEMENTS, MONEY, PROPERTY AND TO
LEVY TAXES AND TO PERFORM MUNICIPAL FUNCTIONS.

Article VI, Section 29 of the Utah Constitution provides as follows:
"The legislature shall not delegate to any special commission, private corporation or association,
any power to make, supervise or interfere with any
municipal improvement, monley, property or effects, whether held in trust or otherwise, to levy
taxes, to select a capitol site, or to perform any municipal functions.
The most recent case to discuss this question is Backman vs. Salt Lake County, 375 P2d. 765, 13 Utah 2d. 412.
There the Civic Auditorium Act, which was patterned
upon the water district act was held to be unconstitutional

he S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and L
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3
in that it was a delegation to a special commission. The
Court held that three provisions or conditions are necessary to violate this section of the Constitution. They are:
1. Delegation to a private commission of power to

2. Interfere with municipal property, or
3. To perform a municipal function.
The commission created under 17-29, UCA, 1953, as
amended, is no different than the commission created under the Civic Auditorium Act. Under the Civic Auditorium
Act there are more members, the County Commissioners
select only part of the Commission, but there is no difference in substance. If the County Service Area Act had been
amended to provide for the building of a civic auditorium
and sports arena could one hold that the result of the
Backman case would have been differenrt? Sound reasoning says No.
Sections 10-8-90 and 17-5-45, UCA, 1953, give to cities
and towns of the third class and to counties respectively
the right to construct, own and operate hospitals jointly
with other cities, towns and counties. This meets the second and third requiremenJts set forth by the Supreme
Court in the Backman case.
Other comparisons between the Civic Auditorium Act
and the County Service Area Act show this to be a special
commission in violation of the Constitution.
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The Civic Auditorium and Sports Arena Act provides
the district is authorized to:
(a) Make, construct and supervise a civic auditorium
(which is a "municipal improvement") (11-11-2, 11-11-13).
(b) Control money for and from the operation thereof
(so the district "supervises money" (11-11-13).
(c) Levy Taxes (11-11-13).
The County Service Area Act provides the district is
authorized to:
(a) Provide hospital services (which is a "municipal
improvement") (17-~9-3).
(b) Control money for and from the operation thereof
(so the district "supervises money") (17-29-10.2 [41] ).
(c) Levy Taxes (17-29-13, 14).
In the case of Lehi City vs. Meiling, 48 P. 2d 530, 87
Utah 237, the question of a "special commission" was
raised. The majority opinion (p. 535) gave no reason but
merely said the district was not a special commission.
Speaking of the Lehi case the court said in the Backman case (p. 419):
"Here is a distinction between this case and
the Metropolitan Water District Act, as interpreted
in Lehi vs. M eiling . . . With somewhat tortous
reasoning, punctuated by two dissents and a special
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concurring opinion, that case obviously was predicated on the assumption that because of a magnitude of water projects which could not have been
accomplished by a single municipality coupled with
statewide concern and interest in water consumption and conservation, together with the fact that
that act was not only general and uniform, calling
for such promotion not coterminous with any city
or county, but available for many cities and counties, overlapping or non-contiguous, there was no
special commission performing a municipal function."
POINT II
THE 12 PER CENT DEBT LIMITATION WOULD
VIOLATE ARTICLE XIV, SECTIONS 3 and 4 OF THE
STATE CONSTITUTION.
Said Sections provide, in part, as follows:
"Section 3. No debt in excess of the taxes for the
current year shall be created by any county or subdivision thereof, or by a school district therein, or
by any city, town or village, or any subdivision
thereof in this state; unless the proposition to create such debt, shall have been submitted to a vote
of such qualified electors as shall have paid a property tax therein, in the year preceding such election, and a majority of those voting thereon shall
have voted in favor of incurring such debt."
"Sec. 4. When authorized to create indebtedness as provided in Section 3 of this Article, no
county shall become indebted to an amount, including existing indebtedness exceeding two per centum. No city, town, school district or other municipal corporation, shall become indebted to an
amount, including existing indebtedness, exceeding
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four per centum of the value of taxable property
therein ... "
The act provides for a limitation on the district debt
of 12 per cent (17-29-21).
District area is part of a county area (17-29-5). If the
Legislature by the mere subterfuge of saying that the
county constitutes a district, or a part of the county constitutes a district, can avoid the 2 per cent limitation of
indebtedness upon counties, then the above sections are
emasculated. The Legislature could then declare that the
county or parts thereof constituted any number of districts
and thereby create enough taxing units that the result
could be any amount of indebtedness even up to 100 per
cent. If these constiutitonal sections are giveDJ effect, the
total of authorized indebtedness of the county and any
district therein should not exceed 2 per cent of that of a
town or city of the third class should not exceed 4 per cent.
The majority opinion in the Lehi case (supra) (p. 541)
solved this problem by the simple expedient of declaring
that a district was a "quasi municipal" body. The decision
then reasoned that it has some attributes of a municipal
corporation but does not have to comply with the limitations placed by the constitution on such corporations. The
concurring opinion of Judge Wolfe (p. 549) concludes that
the function of the district is proprietary, not governmental. He somehow concludes therefrom that this takes the
district out of the classification of a "municipal corporation. "The dissent (p. 553) logically argues that:
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"The Constitution of Utah provides for the organization, management, an'd operation of two classes of corporations, viz., municipal corporations, and
private corporations. For the Legislature or the
courts by supplying a different adjective modifier
to the word 'corporation,' and thereby bring about
a new hybrid entity that is neither municipal nor
private within the purview of the terms of the Utah
Constitution, appeals as a refinement. It is an easy
method to avoid the plain terms of the State Constitution. If constitutional limitations may thus by
a process of definition be eliminated, evaded, or
evaporated out of the Constitution, the stabilizing
purposes and restraints of Constitutions intended
to tide the people over periods of emergency, excitement, or trouble until calm reflection may analyze
and measure the needs, will cease to accomplish the
purposes for which they are intended."
The memorandum decision by the Honorable C. Nelson Day, District Judge, says that this is controlled by the
cases of Tygeson vs. Magna Water Company, 226 P 2d. 127;
Lehi City vs. Meiling, 48 P 2d. 530, 87 Utah 237; and Patterick vs. Carbon Water Conservancy District, 106 Utah
55, 145 P 2d. 503. All three of these cases can be distinguished from the present case in that each of them concerned water which has been given special treatment by
the courts. In the Backman case this court held in a majority opinion "that case was obviously predicated on the
assumption that because of the magnitude of the water
project which could not have been accomplished by a
single municipality, coupled with statewide concern and
interest in water consumption and conservation," was the
reason the court decided that case.
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In the matter now before the court a single municipality, Beaver, County, can and in reality is building two
hospitals. The two service areas combined include all of
Beaver County and nothing else. No good reason has been
advanced why Beaver County can not and should not build
hospitals rather than dividing into service areas. It was
to prevent this very thing that the constitutional limitations were placed upon the legislature.

POINT III
IF· THE DISTRICT IS NOT A "SPECIAL COMMISSION" THEN IT MUST BE A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, OTHERWISE ARTICLE XIII, SECTION 5 OF
THE CONSTITUTION IS VIOLATED.
Article 13, Section 5, provides:
"The Legislature shall not impose taxes for the
purpose of any county, city, town or other municipal corporation, but, may, by law, vest in the corporate authorities thereof, respectively, the power
to assess and collect taxes for all purposes of such
corporation."
This section allows the powers of taxation to be exercised only by certain bodies; The only classification, under
which the water district could fall is the classification of
municipal corporation. In order to exercise the powers of
taxation it must be a municipal corporation. If it is a municipal corporation, then the debt limitation of a municipal
corporation set out under Article 14, Sections 3 and 4 discussed in Point II would be violated.
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Furthermore, the levying of taxes for county purposes
i~ limited by this constitutional provision to the corporate
authorities of the county as pointed out in State v. Standj(fl"d, 24 Utah 148, 66 Pac. 1061, wherein the c_ourt said:
"Under the Constitution of the State of Utah
the state has no power to make a disposition of
county funds, and require that they be appropriated
for other and different purposes than those for
which by authority of the county they were collected. San Louis Obispo Co. v. Graves, 84 Cal. 71,
23 Pac. 1032. In our opinion Section 5, Article 13, of
the Constitution not only limits local or county taxation to local county purposes, but it was also intended as a limitation upon the power of the legislature to grant the right or impose the duty of creating a debt or levying a tax to any person or body
other than the corporate authorities of the county."
The building and operation of hospitals is a municipal
function which Beaver County could undertake without
the creation of separate districts to accomplish the same
purpose.

CONCLUSION
This is an attempt by a single municipality, Beaver
County, to divide itself and then perform functions as two
units which it would just as well perform as a single unit.
By so dividing the county, the county and cities within it are attempting to place themselves in a position to
by pass the debt limitations placed upon them by the
Constitution.
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Neither the respondents in their presentation to the
District Court nor the Honorable C. Nelson Day in his
memorandum decision have answered the question as to
why the County canlnot build hospitals rather than divide
the County into Service Areas and then tax the same
people for the same services.
Respectfully submitted,

J. HAROLD CALL
Bank Building
Heber City, Utah
Attorney for Appellant
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